Coronavirus Consequences (Part 2)

While I tend not to write about current events, in the last article I introduced a set of worldwide consequences from the spread of the novel Wuhan coronavirus. We are still learning a lot about this disease, its origins and how it spreads. But with another week of information, here are additions to the consequences that may come from this disease and the reaction to it.

What scares some people about the novel coronavirus is not only the mortality rate of 2% to 3% — or 20 – 50 times that of the influenza in a typical year. Rather, it’s that the systems for spreading this coronavirus are different, that the animal origination of the disease is another sign that species crossover may become more common in the future, and that there are other technological changes that we may also see.

On species crossover, we have this quote from a NY Times opinion piece by David Quammen, titled We Made the Coronavirus Epidemic:

“[Researcher] Mr. Daszak told me that, during that second study [of bat caves], the field team took blood samples from a couple of thousand Yunnanese people, about 400 of whom lived near the cave. Roughly 3 percent of them carried antibodies against SARS-related coronaviruses.

“‘We don’t know if they got sick. We don’t know if they were exposed as children or adults,’ Mr. Daszak said. “But what it tells you is that these viruses are making the jump, repeatedly, from bats to humans.’ In other words, this Wuhan emergency is no novel event. It’s part of a sequence of related contingencies that stretches back into the past and will stretch forward into the future, as long as current circumstances persist….

“Current circumstances include a perilous trade in wildlife for food, with supply chains stretching through Asia, Africa and to a lesser extent, the United States and elsewhere. That trade has now been outlawed in China, on a temporary basis; but it was outlawed also during SARS, then allowed to resume — with bats, civets, porcupines, turtles, bamboo rats, many kinds of birds and other animals piled together in markets such as the one in Wuhan.”

“We invade tropical forests and other wild landscapes, which harbor so many species of animals and plants — and within those creatures, so many unknown viruses. We cut the trees; we kill the animals or cage them and send them to markets. We disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.”

It’s been known for a while that bats are reservoirs of coronaviruses.

That human activity impacts the species crossover of communicable disease shouldn’t surprise anyone. But how do we lessen this risk when it is more common for humans to push up against animal habitats and for humans to demand certain animal products?

I earlier wrote about risk and that wildlife trade in Anything at Scale, but from the perspective of demand for luxury items.

“Culture and history influence demand for physical items. An existing population that rather suddenly has money to spend means that a larger percentage of its people can act on their demands.

“For example, rhinoceros horn, elephant ivory, cordyceps, and wild ginger mostly grow thousand of miles from their primary modern sources of demand.”

But with the coronavirus, this risk is instead driven by the increased bumping of human and animal populations.

Environmental regulations in some countries attempt to improve the environmental impact by legislating the preservation of the environment. But economics means that landowners will sometimes work against the intent of these regulations.

As I asked in Importing Risk and Risky Regulations, should we provide “compensation to landowners who lose land value for making their land hospitable to endangered species?” (And in the process, less hospitable to humans?)

Otherwise, should we expect even more bumping of human and animal populations?

Identification and responsibility

Dr. Li Wenliang first identified something more severe about the new virus and warned his alumni group on Wechat in December. He was reprimanded for inciting fear: “The day after he posted information in the group, he was asked by the Hospital Supervision Department to write a reflection on the spread of false information. On the morning of January 3, he went to the police station and signed a ‘discipline book.'”

Dr. Li has since died of coronavirus.

I understand not wanting to create unnecessary fear. The initial response  to Dr. Li however did extend the window on letting the novel coronavirus spread.

What new balance can we strike between reporting a potential outbreak and causing panic? Could we create a market of sorts for reporting disease outbreaks that would benefit or penalize those who contribute?

This is a balance that the Chinese government has, well, struggled with over the past decades. How do you not cause panic while also keeping people safe. Politics aside, I believe that many outside observers are critical of those attempts at balance, whether in the case of the novel coronavirus, SARS, Xinjiang, or other issues.

Seeing reasons for surveillance

I earlier covered surveillance technology in  my articles on Uyghurs in Xinjiang and The Emergence of Omniscience. Those two articles included examples of mass camera installations and visual identification technology being used in questionable ways (depending on your politics, as above). But what if the argument for surveillance tech was that in high risk times when disease can spread far and fast, we need this surveillance to prevent people. Consider the case of the infectious traveler below. As reported by Reuters:

“When the man from Hangzhou returned home from a business trip, the local police got in touch. They had tracked his car by his license plate in nearby Wenzhou, which has had a spate of coronavirus cases despite being far from the epicenter of the outbreak. Stay indoors for two weeks, they requested. After around 12 days, he was bored and went out early. This time, not only did the police contact him, so did his boss. He had been spotted near Hangzhou’s West Lake by a camera with facial recognition technology, and the authorities had alerted his company as a warning. ‘I was a bit shocked by the ability and efficiency of the mass surveillance network. They can basically trace our movements with the AI technology and big data at any time and any place,’ said the man, who asked not to be identified for fear of repercussions.”

Rideshare companies that have extra data about their passengers can now be proactive in their approach. From the article Coronavirus: Uber blocks drivers who picked up coronavirus man:

“Uber has suspended hundreds of customer accounts in Mexico, after discovering two of its drivers had transported a passenger infected with coronavirus… When he [the passenger] arrived back in the United States he was tested positive for coronavirus.”

The riskiness of the disease combined with the availability of the technology presents the following conundrum. If Uber can identify risk of coronavirus infection yet withholds the information, it will allow harm to happen. If it does proactively suspend accounts or otherwise use the information, some people will also be harmed through lost revenue, and potential false positives.

People Are Bad at Estimating Risk

Articles like this one from LinkedIn misrepresent the coronavirus risk.

Risk is a measure of uncertainty. The problem is not that too much weight is applied to the novel coronavirus as compared to the flu in other years, but that the system for global impact is different for the coronavirus. The world is much more connected (in 2019, 18 times the 2004 base rate of China to US travel during SARS). And the fatality rate is much higher (20 to 50 times) than the typical flu. The risk is that the novel coronavirus outcomes could be wildly unpredictable if not controlled, not that we shouldn’t worry about it since we don’t worry much about the flu at other times.

The number of cases, fatalities, and recoveries are tracked here: https://multimedia.scmp.com/widgets/china/wuhanvirus/

Some have noted that the growth rate, as measured by new cases, is now slowing. That’s good news.

Consider

  • Increased animal to human disease transfer and greater physical connectedness and movement of populations around the world, and new technology that can track movement and identity will change opinion on surveillance technology.
  • Can we create a system where doctors or other experts can raise their concerns without fear of punishment?
  • Will the mandate to stay inside improve the long-term results from delivery businesses? Will businesses and employees that do remote work benefit? What long-term impact will it have on businesses that provide their products completely online, such as gaming and social media?

This was Part 2 of this topic. You might like to read Part 1, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5.